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Introduction: what’s this paper about? 
- The entry mode choice (namely, ownership choice in 
M&As) in foreign countries by Emerging 
Multinational Companies (EMNCs) vs. Advanced 
Multinational Companies (AMNCs) 
- in advanced countries 
 
- Why there should be a difference?  
 
- The institutional and economic environment differ 
- The ownership advantages (FSAs) differ 
 
 
 
Conceptual background 
- MNCs entering a foreign country suffer from liability of 
foreignness, i.e. uncertainty related to the context they 
are not familiar with 
 
 
 
- They prefer lighter commitments, higher flexibility 
(possibly maintaining a local partner) 
 
- This is particularly true for EMNCs that, in addition to 
liability of foreignness, also suffer from liability of origin 
 
 
 
Conceptual background 
- Liability of origin (or negative country of origin image) can 
make the EMNCs’ acquisition of legitimacy in the 
advanced host country market far more difficult 
 
- EMNCs are often subject to discrimination by 
competitors, consumers and even by governments in 
advanced markets, due to prevailing biases against 
practices, products and services associated with emerging 
economies, to geopolitical considerations, or to a lack 
confidence in EMFs’ capabilities. 
Hypothesis 1 
- Given that EMNCs suffer not only from a liability of 
foreignness, but also have a liability of origin, they are 
likely to suffer from higher uncertainty. 
 
 
Hypothesis 1  
EMNCs will acquire lower equity control than AMNCs 
Additional uncertainty – industrial dimension 
- Additional uncertainty arise in high technology 
sectors, due to the difficulties to codify the 
characteristics of products and technologies by the 
investing company (and to the lack of adequate 
absorptive capacity) 
 
 
Hypothesis 2  
Hypothesis 1 is strengthened in high tech industries 
Additional uncertainty – institutional dimension 
- Uncertainty may arise also from institutional distance 
(Zhao et al., 2004) 
- The organizational legitimacy perspective argues that 
in a very unfamiliar environment, MNEs from more 
dissimilar institutional environments tend to share 
ownership with a local partner in exchange for 
adaptation to the external environment (Zaheer, 
1995). 
 
Hypothesis 3  
MNCs will acquire lower control when institutional 
distance is higher 
 
Institutional distance or difference 
- The direction of distance is crucial (Zaheer et al., 2012). 
- Thus, contrary to previous evidence about the impact of 
institutional distance on the MNC entry mode choice, 
we expect that EMNCs investing in developed countries 
do not need to rely on a local partner to reduce 
uncertainty, and are more likely to adopt more control. 
 
 
Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 3 does not hold when acquirers come from 
emerging economies 
Data and methodology 
- Sample: 451 acquisitions undertaken by foreign 
MNCs in Italy between 2001 and 2010 in 78 
manufacturing industries (Reprint Database – 
Politecnico di Milano). 
 
- 93 acquisitions by EMNCs, 358 by AMNCs. 
 
Dependent variable 
Degree of Ownership EMNCs AMNCs Total 
Minority ownership 13 49 62 
% 13.98 13.69 13.75 
Equal Ownership 15 9 24 
% 16.13 2.51 5.32 
Majority ownership 20 50 70 
% 21.51 13.97 15.52 
Full ownership 45 250 295 
% 48.39 69.83 65.41 
Total 93 358 451 
 
 
Degree of Ownership takes 
value k=0, 1, 2, 3, for minority, 
equal, majority and full 
ownership, respectively 
 
 
Explanatory and control variables 
- Dummy Emerging: taking value of 1 if the parent company 
come from a country classified as emerging by IMF 
- Target Tech Industry: dummy taking value of 1 if the industry 
of the target firm is classified as high-tech by OECD 
- Institutional Distances: Kogut and Singh (1988) formula to 
compute an index for each of the items provided by the 
Heritage Foundation 
 
 
- Controls: target size (employees), parent tech (OECD), parent 
local experience (dummy) 
- Econometric model: robust ordered probit 
Hypothesis 1: Yes 
  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Emerging -0.660*** -0.569*   -0.680**  -1.040*** 
 
(-3.56)    (-2.46)    (-2.68)    (-4.62)    
Target Tech Industry 0.059    0.091    0.110    0.090    
 
(0.35)    (0.56)    (0.70)    (0.57)    
Institutional distance items: 
    
 
Property rights 0.395*** 
   
 
(4.50)    
   
 
Freedom from corruption 
 
0.147    
  
  
(1.69)    
  
 
Fiscal Freedom 
  
-0.009    
 
   
(-0.25)    
 
 
Government Spending 
   
0.118*   
    
(2.33)    
Size -0.117*** -0.113*** -0.105*** -0.096*** 
 
(-5.54)    (-4.57)    (-4.33)    (-4.00)    
Parent Tech Industry 
0.258    0.301    0.285    0.237    
(1.20)    (1.41)    (1.35)    (1.05)    
Local Experience -0.061    -0.135    -0.140    -0.080    
 
(-0.42)    (-0.91)    (-0.87)    (-0.55)    
Constant cut1 -2.236*** -2.392*** -2.617*** -2.490*** 
 
(-4.64)    (-4.46)    (-5.34)    (-5.23)    
Constant cut2 -1.986*** -2.147*** -2.373*** -2.243*** 
 
(-4.10)    (-4.00)    (-4.83)    (-4.70)    
Constant cut3 -1.430**  -1.603**  -1.833*** -1.695*** 
 
(-2.93)    (-2.94)    (-3.69)    (-3.52)    
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes 
     
N 
 
451 451 451 451 
chi2 157.496    151.647    163.009    128.197    
p   0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Hypothesis 2: Yes 
 
  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Emerging -0.499*   -0.429    -0.556*   -0.904*** 
 
(-2.45)    (-1.78)    (-2.10)    (-3.83)    
Target Tech Industry 0.289    0.292    0.305    0.310    
 
(1.50)    (1.51)    (1.64)    (1.66)    
Institutional distance items:     
 
Property rights 0.408*** 
   
 
(4.83)    
   
 
Freedom from corruption 
 
0.149    
  
  
(1.75)    
  
 
Fiscal Freedom 
  
-0.005    
 
   
(-0.14)    
 
 
Government Spending 
   
0.124*   
    
(2.45)    
Size -0.128*** -0.123*** -0.114*** -0.106*** 
 
(-5.86)    (-4.82)    (-4.65)    (-4.38)    
Parent Tech Industry 
0.255    0.300    0.285    0.233    
(1.20)    (1.42)    (1.36)    (1.04)    
Local Experience -0.034    -0.114    -0.120    -0.055    
 
(-0.23)    (-0.76)    (-0.74)    (-0.37)    
Emerging* 
Target Tech Industry 
-0.655*   -0.559*   -0.549    -0.617*   
(-2.31)    (-1.99)    (-1.92)    (-2.26)    
Constant cut1 -2.107*** -2.303*** -2.532*** -2.395*** 
 
(-4.42)    (-4.33)    (-5.17)    (-5.01)    
Constant cut2 -1.855*** -2.058*** -2.287*** -2.147*** 
 
(-3.88)    (-3.87)    (-4.65)    (-4.47)    
Constant cut3 -1.298**  -1.513**  -1.747*** -1.598**  
 
(-2.68)    (-2.79)    (-3.50)    (-3.29)    
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes 
     
N 
 
451 451 451 451 
chi2 160.846    162.397    197.814    178.114    
p   0.000    0.000    0.000   0.000    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Hypothesis 3 and 4: Yes… 
  
  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Emerging -0.761*  -0.748** -0.905*** -1.095*** -1.321*** 
 
(-2.42)    (-2.86)    (-3.46)    (-3.92)    (-3.72)    
Target Tech Industry 0.095    0.101    0.115    0.078    0.121    
 
(0.59)    (0.64)    (0.73)    (0.48)    (0.77)    
Institutional distance items:      
 
Business Freedom 0.185    
    
 
(0.97)    
    
 
Monetary Freedom 
 
-0.814    
   
  
(-0.44)    
   
 
Trade Freedom 
  
-2.577* 
  
   
(-2.14)    
  
 
Investment Freedom 
   
-0.417* 
 
    
(-2.06)    
 
 
Financial Freedom 
    
-0.046    
     
(-0.24)    
Size -0.109*** -0.107*** -0.103*** -0.116*** -0.109*** 
 
(-4.29)    (-4.92)    (-4.40)    (-4.85)    (-4.93)    
Parent Tech Industry 
0.257    0.285    0.268    0.253    0.272    
(1.14)    (1.29)    (1.24)    (1.18)    (1.30)    
Local Experience -0.122    -0.136    -0.168    -0.027    -0.083    
 
(-0.80)    (-0.84)    (-1.03)    (-0.17)    (-0.53)    
Emerging* Institutional 
Distance -0.068    0.824    2.606* 0.533* 0.336 
 
(-0.28)    (0.45)    (2.16)    (2.42)    (1.65)    
Constant cut1 -2.541*** -2.648*** -2.835*** -2.740*** -2.888*** 
 
(-5.54)    (-5.09)    (-5.49)    (-5.76)    (-5.67)    
Constant cut2 -2.296*** -2.404*** -2.590*** -2.496*** -2.642*** 
 
(-4.97)    (-4.61)    (-5.01)    (-5.21)    (-5.15)    
Constant cut3 -1.754*** -1.865*** -2.046*** -1.949*** -2.096*** 
 
(-3.77)    (-3.52)    (-3.91)    (-4.05)    (-4.09)    
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
      N 
 
451 451 451 451 451 
chi2 116.158    170.610    127.177    130.209    127.066    
p   0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000   
 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Hypothesis 3 and 4: …and no 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Emerging -0.392    -0.563    -0.541 -0.792** 
 
(-1.54)    (-1.35)    (-1.73)    (-3.14)    
Target Tech Industry 0.065    0.092    0.113    0.091    
 
(0.39)    (0.57)    (0.72)    (0.58)    
Institutional distance items:     
 
Property Rights 0.526*** 
   
 
(4.40)    
   
 
Freedom from Corruption 
 
0.147    
  
  
(1.61)    
  
 
Fiscal Freedom 
  
0.044    
 
   
(0.53)    
 
 
Government Spending 
   
0.168* 
    
(2.49)    
Size -0.120*** -0.113*** -0.102*** -0.102*** 
 
(-5.52)    (-4.62)    (-4.05)    (-4.43)    
Parent Tech Industry 
0.245    0.301    0.277    0.252    
(1.13)    (1.41)    (1.30)    (1.10)    
Local Experience -0.084    -0.135    -0.127    -0.065    
 
(-0.60)    (-0.91)    (-0.80)    (-0.46)    
Emerging* Institutional 
Distance -0.258    -0.007    -0.075    -0.095    
 
(-1.18)    (-0.02)    (-0.73)    (-1.06)    
Constant cut1 -2.001*** -2.389*** -2.567*** -2.419*** 
 
(-4.13)    (-4.34)    (-5.26)    (-5.12)    
Constant cut2 -1.751*** -2.145*** -2.323*** -2.172*** 
 
(-3.61)    (-3.89)    (-4.72)    (-4.61)    
Constant cut3 -1.195*  -1.601** -1.783*** -1.624*** 
 
(-2.44)    (-2.85)    (-3.58)    (-3.40)    
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes 
     
N 
 
451 451 451 451 
chi2 158.600    162.892    156.335    132.159    
p   0.000    0.000   0.000   0.000    
 
Conclusions 
- Higher uncertainty (liability of foreignness + liability of 
origin) makes EMNCs more incline (than AMNCs) to 
adopt a partial ownership as entry mode (in foreign 
acquisitions) 
 
- Institutional distance leads to different behaviors 
between AMNCs and EMNCs.  
 
- Need of disentangling institutional distance  
 
